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Can a business case be made for acting sustainably? This is a difficult question to answer 
precisely, largely because there is no generally accepted definition of the term “sustainability”. Is 
it acting sustainably to protect the human rights of the firm’s workforce? To invest in education 
in local communities? To switch to renewable power? All of these actions might improve social 
welfare, and some of them might improve profitability but they are very different, and the 
business case for each of them is similarly likely to look quite different. Here I begin to explore 
the issue by focusing on a more limited question, namely whether a business case be made for 
acting in an environmentally sustainable way, which I define as acting in any way that reduce a 
firm’s environmental footprint. 
 
An accumulating body of research suggests that reducing the environmental impact of the private 
sector is likely to have significant social returns (Stern, 2008; Jorgenson et al, 2014). Reducing 
the use of fossil fuel based energy and hence of CO2 emissions reduces the risk of climate 
change, for example, and using fewer raw materials and adopting more sustainable fishing or 
farming practices reduces pressure on the world’s eco-systems. However it is not immediately 
clear that these kinds of actions are likely to yield significant private returns. The risks of climate 
change or of eco-system destruction are classic “externalities” in that their costs accrue to the 
broader society and not to a particular firm, so that in a competitive market firms that invest to 
reduce their environmental footprint – by, for example, reducing the amount of waste they 
generate, using renewable energy or investing in more efficient equipment – are running the risk 
of putting themselves at a competitive disadvantage if these actions simply contribute to the 
public good.  
 
The substantial scholarly literature that has attempted to measure the relationship between 
economic returns and sustainable behavior underlines this tension, finding that at the very least 
the relationship between addressing environmental issues and immediate financial returns is a 
complex one. Margolis and Walsh, (2003), for example, in one of the best summaries of this 
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literature, find no evidence that embracing sustainability increases profitability, and although 
some recent papers suggest that these kinds of investments can increase returns (See, for 
example, Eccles et. al, 2013), other work continues to find no correlation between financial 
returns and investments in sustainability. Figure (1), for example, maps the relationship between 
a comprehensive set of social and environmental indicators and financial performance over the 
previous two years for 1,100 CEOs (Hansen et al, 2013). It suggests – and the authors confirm – 
that the correlation between them is very close to zero. 
 
Figure 1 Hansen/Ibarra about here 
 
Does this evidence imply that the business case for investing in environmental sustainability 
cannot be made? Certainly some observers has suggested that this is the case, arguing that the 
public sector is much better equipped to handle environmental problems than the private, and 
that at best those private firms who invest in environmental sustainability (hereafter simply 
“sustainability”) are engaged in sophisticated green washing (Stavins, 2011).  
 
In this chapter, however, I argue that this conclusion is fundamentally mistaken. The push to 
transform our economy from one based on the premise that natural resources are inexhaustible 
and that waste can be freely disposed of to one that acknowledges natural limits and actively 
minimizes waste is fundamentally disruptive, requiring firms to make sustainability a central 
strategic concern and to change their operations, strategies and organizational processes in 
fundamental ways. As such, it will require business leaders to actively manage the tension 
between “exploitation”, or the need to continue to exploit current ways of doing things and 
“exploration”, and the need to invest in preparing for a major shift. One of the reasons that these 
kinds of discontinuities challenge the status quo is that the investments required to prepare for 
the future are rarely immediately profitable (Bresnahan, 2012; Christensen, 1997; Tushman and 
Romanelli, 1985). The business case for making them cannot rely on immediate, short term 
returns. Instead it rests on a sophisticated understanding of the risks entailed in doing nothing 
and on the opportunities inherent in moving early to prepare for a range of plausible futures.  
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It is thus not surprising that cross sectional analyses of the relationship between financial returns 
and investments in sustainability do not – as yet – yield any easy answers. In a number of 
industries – particularly in energy, the built environment, agriculture and consumer goods – 
investments to increase environmental sustainability have compelling economics on short time 
frames. But in many sectors these kinds of investments are best thought of as experiments, 
strategic hedges, or plausible bets against a coming world, rather than as investments that are 
likely to shift overall corporate performance today. The recognition that this is the case has 
significant implications for not only how leaders should make the case for change, but also for 
the ways in which the strategy making process should be managed and for the ways in which 
investments in sustainability should be organized.  
 
To make this case I begin by focusing on those instances in which investing in sustainability 
already yields immediate, predictable returns. Building on a range of examples and the typology 
developed in Esty and Winston’s “Green to Gold” (2006) I suggest that three business models 
have emerged to date as particularly powerful ways to make money from acting sustainably: 
forestalling risk, increasing operational efficiency and selling to the environmental niche. I then 
draw on a scenario technique developed by Peter Schwartz (1996) to highlight the way in which 
increasing environmental degradation is likely to create the conditions under which these models 
will become increasingly compelling across a wide range of industries.  
 
I argue that in many industries increasing environmental pressures may lead to major changes in 
the competitive context – including significant shifts in the nature of consumer demand, in the 
regulatory environment and in the availability of cost effective environmentally friendly 
technology. I suggest that these uncertainties mean that most firms face (at least) four possible 
futures, in three of which investing in sustainability is likely to be a significant source of 
competitive advantage. Using the examples of Unilever, M&S, Nissan, Duke and BP, I suggest 
that leading firms are already using this perspective to make the case for investing in 
sustainability, despite the fact that these kinds of investments may not be immediately profitable 
in a “business as usual” scenario. I suggest that the key to building a business case in these 
circumstances is to make investments that are robust -- to make investments that are at least 
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marginally profitable in today’s world, but that simultaneously position the firm for significant 
competitive advantage as and when the competitive context changes.  
 
I close by suggesting that this perspective has important implications for the effective leadership 
of sustainable change, since it implies that investing in sustainability requires the explicit 
recognition that the firm faces a multiplicity of possible futures. Leading effectively in the face 
of this kind of uncertainty requires both challenging the conventional strategy process and the 
ability to hold the organizational tension inherent in investing in any “exploratory” project 
(March, 1991). Rather than insisting that environmental investments are certain to yield returns, 
leading effective change requires senior leaders to create both organizational and strategic 
flexibility inside the firm, and to create the capability to be both efficient and sustainable. These 
are precisely the kinds of capabilities highlighted so effectively in this book (See for example, 
Silvestri and Gulati, Kanter, Tushman, O’Reilly, and Harreld, Ancona et al, and Edmondson et 
al). 
 
 
Investing in Environmental Sustainability: the Case for Current Action 
 
A lively practitioner orientated literature – including “Green to Gold” (Esty and Winston, 2006), 
“Shared Value” (Porter and Kremer, 2011), “The Resource Revolution” (Hecht, 2014) and “The 
Big Pivot” (Winston, 2014) argues that the environmental crisis is creating very significant 
opportunities for the private sector. One particularly compelling example of this stream of work 
is the “McKinsey cost curve” – an analysis by McKinsey, the global consulting firm, that 
suggests that nearly half of all of the currently available opportunities for reducing emissions of 
green-house gases are NPV positive, or economically viable right now (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: McKinsey cost curve about here 
 
Indeed many firms claim to be actively investing in becoming more environmentally sustainable. 
For example nearly 6,000 report issue some form of sustainability report under the GRI, the 
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Global Reporting Initiative
1. “Sustainability” is a broad term, and many of these firms may be 
focused more on social and governance issues than on environmental concerns, but nonetheless 
there is increasingly compelling evidence that environmental sustainability is big business. A 
recent front page article in the New York Times suggested that “Industry Awakens to the Threat 
of Climate Change” and for many firms investments in sustainability appear to have yielded 
immediate returns
2
 Three business models have emerged as particularly promising: forestalling 
risk, increasing operational efficiency and selling to the environmental niche.
3
 
 
Forestalling Risk: Preventing Brand Damage and/or preserving “License to Operate” 
The combination of an increasingly global media, the widespread penetration of social networks 
and an increasingly concerned consumer base has led many firms with large, consumer facing 
brands to invest aggressively in sustainable business practices to forestall potential brand 
damage. Similarly firms facing tight regulatory environments or potentially hostile communities 
have also invested heavily in the attempt to head off potential regulation and/or the loss of the 
firm’s “license to operate”. 
 
For example allegations that Nike’s factories were polluting local water ways were a major 
factor in persuading the firm to invest heavily in sustainability. Nike now employs more than 135 
people in its sustainability group, and has publicly committed to a range of aggressive targets in 
the area. Similarly some years ago Greenpeace accused both McDonalds and Kimberly Clark of 
contributing to deforestation (of the Amazon and of old growth forest in the US, respectively). In 
response McDonalds took the lead in spearheading industry wide efforts to preserve the Amazon, 
and both firms have committed to sourcing policies that promise to steadily increase the 
environmental sustainability of their supply chains.
4
 
 
Coca Cola’s engagement with the question of water scarcity is another striking example. Nearly 
ten years ago Coca Cola – whose brand is estimated to be worth more than $77bn, nearly half of 
                                                          
1
 http://database.globalreporting.org/ 
2
 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/science/earth/threat-to-bottom-line-spurs-action-on-climate.html?_r=0 
3
 How does this typology relate to G to G typology? 
4
http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/mcd/sustainability/library/policies_programs/sustainable_supply_chain/Rainf
orest_Conservation.html 
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the firm’s entire capitalization -- was accused by Indian activists of depleting local water 
suppliers and was the target of widespread local action and global criticism as a result.
5
 While 
the firm disputed the accuracy of the underlying charges it has since launched a major effort 
focused on water, announcing a commitment to become “water neutral”.6 
 
Similar dynamics have led a number of firms – particularly in the chemical and in the extractive 
industries – to invest in reducing their environmental impact in an attempt to preclude 
community pressure and/or additional regulation. The evidence is mixed as to whether such 
‘self-regulation’ is as effective as more standard regulation in reducing pollution (Toffel and 
Short, 2011), but there is compelling evidence that the chemical industry’s extensive investments 
in both waste reduction has more than covered its costs through the delivery of significant 
improvements in operational efficiency (Hoffman, 2002). 
 
Increasing operational efficiency 
As the introduction to this volume suggested, one of the most immediate impacts of the 
environmental crises we face has been increasing input costs. For example figure 3 shows the 
recent increase in commodity prices.  
 
Figure 3 Commodity prices 
 
As a result many firms are finding that there is a great deal of money to be made in increasing 
the efficiency with which resources are used. As Figure (1) suggested, this dynamic is 
particularly salient in the case of energy, where both anecdotal evidence and a number of careful 
comparative studies suggest that a compelling business case for increasing energy efficiency 
exists in many contexts. For example, a recent National Academies study conducted on behalf of 
the Department of Defense concluded that using LEED-Silver or equivalent standards in the 
design and construction of new buildings increased the costs of initial construction between 0-
8%, but that since construction costs are typically only 5-10% of total life cycle costs, building 
“green” or “high performance” buildings increased total costs by less than 1% while reducing 
                                                          
5
 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/16/business/16coke.html?ref=asia&_r=0 
6
 http://www.coca-colacompany.com/stories/our-water-conservation-goal 
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energy costs by between 5 and 30% and water use by 8-11% over the life of the building. The 
commission recommended that all new DOD buildings or major renovations use these 
standards.
7
  
 
The widespread recognition of this opportunity has fueled the growth of hundreds of new firms. 
For example, Johnson Controls, one of the largest players in the space, had 2012 revenues of 
over $14bn in their energy efficiency business, while Schneider Electric, a €23bn global energy 
giant, recently repositioned itself as the “only global specialist in energy management” and 
claimed that more than 35% of its revenues were derived from its integrated solutions business. 
Similarly an increasing fraction of new construction is being built with an eye to increased 
energy efficiency and heavy equipment manufacturers across a range of industries have 
introduced energy efficient products including aerospace engines (GE, Rolls Royce) and 
compressors (Ingersoll Rand, United Technology). 
 
Many firms have also reported significant savings from individual efforts to reduce energy. For 
example KKR claims that the imposition of a systematic process of energy and water reduction 
across their portfolio companies has yielded returns of at least $150m a year for each of the last 
five years (Eccles, Serafeim and Clay, 2012), while between 1990 and 2012 IBM reduced 
electricity consumption by 6.1 billion kWh, saving $477 million through energy conservation 
alone.
8. Maersk, the world’s largest container shipping company, forecasting that the cost of fuel 
was likely to rise from $250/ton in 2008 to $700/ton by 2020, committed to an aggressive 
program of energy efficiency, introducing “slow steaming” by its ships and reducing fuel use by 
7% between 2009 and 2012 (Reinhardt, 2012). One report from the UN Foundation estimated 
that an investment of $US3.2 trillion worldwide in energy conservation would avoid new supply 
investments of $3 trillion and would pay for itself within three to five years.
9
  
 
Similarly technologies that enable reductions in water use are opening up new markets. For 
example Jain Irrigation, an Indian firm specializing in “micro-irrigation” techniques, saw 
                                                          
7
 National Research Council. Energy-Efficiency Standards and Green Building Certification Systems Used by the 
Department of Defense for Military Construction and Major Renovations . Washington, DC: The National 
Academies Press, 2013. 
8
 http://www.ibm.com/ibm/environment/climate/ 
9
 http://www.globalproblems-globalsolutions-files.org/unf_website/PDF/realizing_potential_energy_efficiency.pdf   
8 
 
revenues grow at a 41% compound growth rate between 2005 and 2010 (Goldberg, Knoop and 
Preeble, 2012). Waste reduction is also emerging as a significant opportunity. For example Wal-
Mart claims to reduced waste by more than 80%, and in doing so to have returned $231m to the 
business last year.
10
 Recycling is also an increasingly important business. 70% of the feedstock 
to the aluminum industry, for example, is now derived from recycled materials, saving 95% of 
the energy required to make new aluminum from bauxite ore, and Waste Management estimates 
it could generate $15 billion of revenue annually if it could effectively separate and resell all the 
material in the roughly 100 million tons of garbage it collects each year—something that would 
more than double the size of the company (Hecht, 2014).  
 
 
Selling to the environmental niche 
A number of firms have been able to build successful businesses by developing highly 
differentiated offerings targeted specifically to consumers who value environmental 
performance. While only a relatively small proportion of consumers appear to be willing to pay 
more today for sustainable products, they are supporting some sizeable businesses. Stonyfield 
Farm, for example, had 2012 revenues of $360m and revenues at Patagonia, a leader in this 
space, are estimated to be about $500m. Some of the fastest growing restaurant chains are 
claiming “sustainability” as a key identity. Starbucks is a particularly well known example, but 
Chipotle had 2012 revenues of almost $3bn, while Panera Bread had 2012 revenues close to 
$2bn. Only 10% of Clorox’s approximate $5b of sales are of “green” products, but they have 
been providing much of the firm’s recent growth (Ofek, 2012).  
 
At an even larger scale, Toyota sells more than 230,000 Priuses every year, making it a roughly 
$4.5bn business. Whole Foods had 2012 revenues of $11.7bn, while in the same year the 
sustainably orientated Triodos Bank had € 8.0bn of assets under management, much of it 
provided by retail investors committed to the Bank’s core mission.  
 
Several opportunities to build entirely new kinds of businesses meeting entirely new needs have 
also emerged in the environmental space. The “clean tech” sector is both the most well-known 
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 http://corporate.walmart.com/global-responsibility/environment-sustainability/zero-waste 
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and the largest example. Renewable energy is still a relatively small share of the total energy 
supply, but it is a multi-billion dollar business. Wal-Mart, for example, recently announced that 
there were planning to source 100% of their energy needs from renewable sources by 2020, 
while Verizon has committed to spending $100m on solar power and fuel cell technologies to 
power their operations.
11
 Solar and wind have been growing at double digit rates and now 
provide 12% of total electric power in the US, with world-wide revenues last year on the order of 
$100bn for each of them.
12
  
  
Actively seeking to reduce consumption by building the so-called “shared economy” is another 
source of opportunity. For example Avis recently bought Zipcar, the pioneering provider of 
“wheels when you want them” for $96m, and Zipcar’s success has drawn in a host of new 
competitors, including firms such as Car2Go and Mint Cars on demand. Uber, the leading car 
hailing company, is reported to have revenues of over $20m a week, or more than $1bn a year, 
while Airbnb, the online room rental service, is expected to reach $1bn in revenues this year.
 13
  
 
Building a Business Case in the face of uncertainty: 
Thus in the case of a number of industries – including energy, chemicals, the built environment, 
transportation and consumer goods -- building a business case to act in the face of the 
environmental crisis is already relatively straightforward, and this perhaps explains why so many 
consultants and observers insist that “green is the new gold”. In many sectors of the economy 
and for many firms, however, the business case for investments in sustainability rests much more 
on their ability to position the firm for advantage in anticipation of the ways in which an 
increasingly visible environmental crisis is likely to change the competitive context.  
 
Investing in anticipation of major shifts is always risky, but it is often also a powerful source of 
competitive advantage – or, at the least, a useful means of avoiding competitive disadvantage. In 
                                                          
11
 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/energy_resources_materials/the_disruptive_potential_of_solar_power?cid=R
esourceRev-eml-alt-mkq-mck-oth-1404 
12
 (Pew Charitable Trust “Manufacture, Compete: A Clean Energy Action Plan” 
http://cleantechnica.com/2013/03/12/biofuel-wind-and-solar-global-market-values-set-to-double-by-2012/).  
 
13
 http://allthingsd.com/20131204/uber-essentially-confirms-revenue-estimates-but-bristles-over-source-of-
valleywag-report/ 
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this case, for example, the case for investing to forestall potential brand damage or regulatory 
costs is likely to become increasingly compelling as consumers become increasingly concerned 
about sustainability and as regulators respond to their concerns.  Investing “ahead of the curve” 
may also allow firms to create first mover advantage: investing in sustainability before its 
required, for example, may enable firms to build brand advantage, or to create relationships or 
assets that will serve them well as the world shifts. Third, leading edge firms often shape the 
future to their advantage. No one can be sure what will drive the kinds of technical, cultural and 
political shifts that would make many sustainable business models profitable, but in many cases 
it seems plausible that private sector action – particularly if it can be coordinated with other 
stakeholders – may play an important role in making them happen. Lastly, the increases in 
employee engagement that often emerge as the result of a commitment to sustainability may 
more than cover the usually minimal costs of making some of these preemptive or exploratory 
investments. 
 
I develop this argument in more depth using scenario analysis, a tool that was first developed at 
Shell, the oil major, as a tool for thinking about how a firm might frame strategy in the face of 
very significant uncertainties, when the common assumption that the future is likely to look like 
a slightly modified version of today is unlikely to hold (Wilkinson and Kupers, 2014). In these 
situations it is much more useful to think of the firm as facing several different scenarios, or 
future worlds, in each of which it might be optimal to adopt a very different strategy, rather than 
as being faced with a single future for which it must plan.  
 
I explore three sources of uncertainty whose resolution would have a significant effect on the 
profitability of sustainable action: whether and when mainstream consumers come to value 
sustainable products and services enough to pay for them; whether and when increasingly acute 
environmental pressures generate political pressure for additional environmental regulation; and 
whether and when scientific and technological advances across a range of fields are likely to 
make responding to environmental issues significantly cheaper.  
 
An emerging consumer movement? 
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One of the major uncertainties surrounding the development of sustainable business models is 
the extent to which consumers will be willing to pay a premium for sustainable products and 
services. At the moment the evidence on this point is mixed. On the one hand, one study has 
reported that two-thirds of consumers in six countries say that “as a society, we need to consume 
a lot less to improve the environment for future generations” (66%), and that they feel “a sense 
of responsibility to purchase products that are good for the environment and society” (65%).14 
The same study suggested that consumers in developing markets (Brazil, China, India) were 
more than twice as likely as their counterparts in developed markets (Germany, UK, US) to 
report purchasing products because of environmental and social benefits, being willing to pay 
more for sustainable products and encouraging others to buy from companies that are socially 
and environmentally responsible.  
Careful experimental research similarly suggests that in some situations, some consumers will 
pay a significant premium for some products – although this work is still at a sufficiently early 
stage that we don’t yet have a clear sense for the common factors that are at work across them. 
For example two large scale field experiments conducted with the apparel manufacturer Gap, 
suggested that labels with information about a program to reduce water pollution increased sales 
by 8% amongst female shoppers, although they apparently had no such effect in outlet stores or 
on male shoppers (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2012). Experiments in a major US grocery store 
chain suggested that sales of the two most popular bulk coffees sold in the store rose by almost 
10% when the coffees were labeled as Fair Trade, (Hainmueller, Hiscox and Sequeira, 2011) and 
an experiment on eBay suggested that shoppers were willing to pay a 23% premium for coffee 
labeled Fair Trade (Hiscox, Broukhim, Litwin, 2013). Similarly several studies of consumers’ 
willingness to pay for “green power” suggest that some consumers are willing to pay a premium 
for sustainably produced electricity (Bigerna and Paolo, 2011; Borchers etc al., 2007). 
On the other hand, “green” products and services remain a niche product in many markets, with 
many firms reporting that consumers are not willing to pay more for them. For example Wal-
                                                          
14
 http://www.sustainablebrands.com/news_and_views/articles/rethinking-consumption-finds-
consumers-buying-less-and-betterThe findings are based on an online survey of 6,224 consumers 
across Brazil, China, India, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States conducted in 
September and October 2012. 
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Mart has not marketed its (extensive) green supply chain initiatives directly to consumers, 
apparently fearing that the “green” or “sustainable” label may be interpreted as either 
“expensive” or “lower quality” (Humes, 2011). Whether and when consumer preferences shift in 
this regard clearly has immediate implications for the profitability of acting sustainably.  
Potential Shifts in Political and Regulatory Regimes.  
Similar uncertainties surround whether and when local, state and national governments are likely 
to react to the threat of environmental degradation. For example some US states have imposed 
their own “cap and trade” regimes in an attempt to limit the emissions of green-house gases, 
while others have mandated renewable portfolio standards. Europe has been experimenting with 
several different forms of carbon regulation, while some countries – including Norway and 
Australia -- have imposed significant carbon taxes. The Chinese government appears to be 
attempting to shift its power sector towards a less carbon intensive mix. Attempts to create a 
global carbon regime have so far been unsuccessful, but if the effects of climate change are as 
significant as some forecast, they may one day succeed.  
 
Governments across the world are also exploring the possibility of increasing regulatory 
protection for natural systems such as water, clean air, and a variety of natural habitats, as well as 
potentially tightening up rules for the disposal of many different kinds of waste, with recent 
Australian and Chinese activity in this space perhaps the most far reaching example.
15
 Since 
these kinds of regulations are often viewed as constraints on short term economic growth it is 
very difficult to predict how they will evolve going forward, but historically significant increases 
in living standards have been accompanied by political pressure to raise environmental 
standards, so that accelerating growth in the developing world may well increase the pressure for 
environmental regulation. Again, appropriate regulation can, of course, completely shift the 
landscape for private sector action. In the US, for example, investments in wind power have 
fluctuated significantly in response to the presence or absence of tax credits
16
, while the 
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 http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21583245-china-worlds-worst-polluter-largest-investor-green-energy-
its-rise-will-have 
16
 http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-09/wind-energy-companies-prepare-for-tax-credits-end 
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installation of solar power in Germany has been entirely dependent on the provision of generous 
incentives from the German government.
17
  
 
Technological responses 
 
Yet another critically important uncertainty is the question of how rapidly technological 
solutions are likely to emerge in response to the kinds of environmental pressures we are likely 
to face, since investing preemptively in these kinds of opportunities can often create advantage 
as costs come down. For example Duke Energy’s investments in renewable energy have forced 
them to explore both the technological challenges and the policy hurdles inherent in moving to 
distributed power generation, while both IBM and Cisco are investing aggressively in exploring 
the potential for technology to enable the creation of “Smart Cities”. New technologies can 
rarely be adopted off the shelf, since their successful adoption usually requires the development 
of detailed knowledge about how they are likely to be used and how they can best be integrated 
into existing systems.  
 
This issue is particularly salient since humans are almost infinitely resourceful, and it is possible 
that the next ten years will see major breakthroughs in resource use, in agriculture and in energy 
production that dramatically lower their costs. For example the cost of both solar and wind 
power has fallen dramatically over the last ten years – some estimates suggest that the cost of 
solar power has fallen by over 80%,
18
 and some experts have predicted that the next few years 
will see a “resource revolution” in which investments of more than $1 trillion may lead to $3-4 
trillion of potential efficiency gains.
19
 Similarly new approaches to the generation of nuclear 
power may significantly reduce costs, waste generation and the threat of nuclear proliferation 
(Sahlman et al, 2012), while in Singapore introducing “smart” transportation systems may cut 
the number of vehicles on the road by over 60% while improving levels of service.
20
 Investing in 
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 Policymaker's Guide to Feed-in Tariff Policies, U.S. National Renewable Energy Lab, 2010, 
www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/44849.pdf 
 
18
 http://cleantechnica.com/2013/05/06/solar-pv-module-prices-have-fallen-80-since-2008-wind-turbines-29/ 
19
 http://www.mckinsey.com/features/resource_revolution 
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http://app.mot.gov.sg/page_land.aspx?p=/Land_Transport/Sustainable_Development/Promoting_Sustainable_Trans
port.aspx&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 
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advance of these kinds of trends can allow the firm to develop the kind of on the ground 
experience, customer knowledge and regulatory relationships that can allow them to take 
advantage of technological change as it occurs.  
 
Scenario Analysis: Exploring the interaction between these trends 
 
Following Peter Schwartz (1996), one can use these uncertainties to define a 2x2 grid defining 
four possible future worlds. I assume that the possibility that consumers will be willing to pay for 
products and services that prevent or mitigate environmental harm is so closely correlated with 
the possibility that there will be increasing political pressure for increased regulation that the two 
are effectively equivalent. This is clearly an enormous simplification, and if one was conducting 
this analysis for a single industry, or for a single geography one could be much more precise – 
but at this very broad level of analysis it’s not an unreasonable first cut. Figure (4) shows the 
results of mapping this possibility against the possibility of significant technological change.  
 
Figure 4 about here: Basic scenario analysis 
 
Any such mapping is necessarily a simplification of a hugely complex underlying reality. This 
particular map, for example, doesn’t explicitly focus on the question of how rapidly 
environmental degradation is likely to occur going forward, and here I thus make the implicit 
assumption that from a business perspective the key issue is not how rapidly the environmental 
crisis is likely to unfold but whether and how such degradation will feed through into consumer 
response or political action. Despite its simplicity, however, this map immediately highlights a 
number of critically important strategic and organizational dynamics. 
 
Between them, the two uncertainties define four possible scenarios: “Business as usual”, “Green 
goes main-stream”, “Demand driven opportunity” and “Supply driven opportunity.”  “Business 
as usual” is a world in which neither consumer demand nor regulatory pressure leads to any 
significant increase in the demand for sustainable products or services, and in which 
implementing sustainable solutions remains relatively expensive. Notice that it could still be a 
world in which there was very substantial environmental degradation – in this world, however, 
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such degradation does not lead to any pressure for action. This is the world that most firms 
experience at present, and it appears to be the future that is taken for granted by many business 
people. For example, Exxon Mobil recently released a report asserting that the firm does not 
believe that there is a significant risk that any of their current reserves will become “stranded”, or 
valueless, as a result of future changes to regulatory policy.
21
  
 
Even those business people who do not believe that “business as usual” is the most likely future 
often act as if it were – as decades of organizational research have taught us, assumptions about 
how the world works and how it is likely to evolve are often deeply embedded in the deep 
structure of an organization – in its identity, in its information processing routines, and in its 
organizational capabilities (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Tushman and 
O’Reilly, 1997). The identity and mental models of an organization often evolve only very 
slowly (MA Glynn in this book; Kaplan, 2008; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000).  
 
“Green goes Mainstream” is a world in which accelerating technological change in combination 
with robust demand driven either by consumer preference or political pressure has opened up 
large markets for sustainable products and services. For those parts of the solar energy and wind 
power industry with strong political support and for those businesses such as Zipcar or Uber that 
already sell to sustainably orientated consumers and for whom the technologies necessary to 
support their business are already in place, this world is already a reality, but for many firms it 
remains only a possibility.  
 
In “Demand Driven Opportunity”, the technological progress necessary to develop new products 
is slow in coming and/or costly, but consumer or voter concern has led to an increasing demand 
for green products and/or for policies the penalize conventional offerings. Firms such as 
Patagonia and Seventh Generation that sell more expensive products to those consumers who 
currently care about sustainability are already experiencing this world, but to date these kinds of 
products remain a relatively small share of the market.  
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“Supply Driven Opportunity”, is a world in which significant technical change has opened up 
opportunities, but neither consumers nor politicians are willing to allocate resources to pay more 
for sustainable products. The very large efforts focused on reducing energy demand are already 
experiencing this world – acting sustainably is economically viable even in the absence of 
consumer demand, and many observers believe that acceleration in raw material prices of all 
kinds will drive significant activity to this space going forward. 
 
Mapping these examples to industries highlights the way in which the current case for 
sustainability differs enormously across the economy, with the major opportunities currently 
occurring in energy, buildings, water, agriculture and consumer goods. In these cases the 
uncertainties I have mapped are increasingly no longer uncertainties – firms can be sure that 
technological progress will occur, or that consumer or regulatory demand will enable them to 
offer a more highly priced product. But framing the strategic space in this way also focuses 
attention on the fact that for many industries, the case for becoming more sustainable rests on the 
assumptions one makes about how these uncertainties are likely to play out.  
 
In many industries raw materials and energy are a relatively small percentage of value added, 
and there is as yet only nascent consumer and political pressure to become more sustainable. One 
way to approach the development of sustainable business models in these contexts is to simply 
insist that the world is changing, and that becoming more sustainable is a far sighted anticipatory 
response. But as the discussion above suggests, we cannot be certain how the world is likely to 
evolve. It might prove to be the case, for example, that technological change triggers such 
significant improvements in resource productivity, and/or such dramatic reductions in the costs 
of carbon free energy, that we can arrest or reverse the environmental decline and resource 
productivity that might otherwise occur. Similarly environmental degradation could continue to 
accelerate, but economic pressure may make mainstream consumers very reluctant to pay for 
green products and there may never be sufficient political will to impose appropriate regulation. 
Even if one believes that both trends are inevitable, there can be significant disagreement about 
the pace of change. It is much easier to make a business case if one is reasonably certainly that 
major regulation is likely to be imposed next year than if one believes it is likely, but not for 
another twenty years. This kind of uncertainty is a constant feature of disruptive or discontinuous 
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change, but it is not, in itself, a reason to do nothing. Nokia, for example, lost its phone business 
because of its inability to make a compelling case to make the investments necessary to compete 
with Apple in the smart phone business, while Corning survived the dot-com crash because it 
had invested in the technology necessarily to make large displays many years in advance of their 
becoming commercially viable.  
 
This uncertainty has very significant implications for the leadership of sustainable change. In the 
first place, it highlights the importance of distinguishing between models that are profitable now, 
given today’s prices and technology, and models that represent strategic bets against possible 
future states of the world. Persuading a firm to make investments that are likely to immediately 
profitable, while by no means always easy, presents a fundamentally different kind of strategic 
and organizational challenge from persuading firms to develop models whose success is 
contingent on some uncertain future state. In the second place, it focuses attention on the 
contingent nature of plausible sustainable business models. Their profitability in any particular 
context is going to be dependent on the rate at which the relevant uncertainties resolve 
themselves and their salience for the nature of the business. In any particular industry, the 
potential profitability of sustainable business models will be dependent on how much pressure 
these forces can exert, and on how rapidly they resolve.  
 
Consider, for example, Unilever’s move to introduce “sustainable tea”. In 2007 Unilever became 
the first major tea company to commit to sustainable sourcing on a large scale. Unilever’s tea 
business is substantial – Unilever sells roughly €3.5bn worth of tea, approximately 30% of the 
world’s market for branded tea, and buys approximately 12% of the world’s supply of black tea. 
The firm is committed to sourcing 100% of its tea sustainably by 2020, and in partnership with 
the Rainforest Alliance has developed an auditable standard. As of February 2014, 39% of 
Unilever’s tea purchases were sourced from Rainforest Alliance certified farms.22 
 
Estimating the economic returns to this effort is complicated by the fact that it is impossible to 
know what would have happened to Unilever’s share of market without the adoption of 
Rainforest Alliance certification, but those numbers that are available suggest that by 2011 the 
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effort had roughly broken even. Moving to certified tea required training farmers – between 2007 
and the end of 2012, for example, 450,000 farmers had been trained to Rainforest Alliance 
standards – and also meant paying a small premium for certified tea. However in some markets 
the introduction of certified tea was associated with significant market share gains, at least in the 
short term. For example in the UK, the introduction of Rainforest Alliance certified tea was 
associated with a share gain of 1.8% (Henderson, 2011). These introductions were not costless – 
for example in the UK, Unilever spent the entire €12m marketing budget on launching the new 
product – but given the difficulty of making share gains in such a hotly contested space these 
results are suggestive. The move to sustainable sourcing also generated economic gains for the 
farmers involved, as in many cases yields increased significantly and costs fell.  
 
Has this strategy been successful? It has since been widely imitated by Unilever’s competitors, 
with many of the world’s largest tea brands announcing a commitment to sustainability. Such 
rapid imitation would suggest that the idea has gained some traction amongst consumers, and 
there is some evidence that Unilever’s commitment to sustainability has significantly increased 
employment commitment and engagement.
23
 Moreover there is no evidence that it has harmed 
the brand, and some that it may even have increased brand equity. 
 
But to think about it this way is to miss the point. Thinking about Unilever’s strategy in the 
context of the scenario grid of figure 4 suggests that it is better thought of as an experiment or as 
a well-designed strategic option. If the world does not change significantly – if the next five 
years see the “business as usual” scenario playing out – then Unilever has lost nothing. But 
should the world change – if, for example, consumer preferences switch aggressively towards 
sustainable brands --  then Unilever may have established a first mover position in consumers’ 
minds that could be tremendously valuable. Less plausibly but still possibly, should climate 
change indeed have a negative effect on the productivity of tea plantations, Unilever’s moves 
may have given it an advantage in accessing worldwide tea supplies. And of course if both 
should happen – should the tea industry move to the “green goes main-stream” future – then in 
retrospect Unilever’s investment will come to be seen as a brilliant strategic move.  
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Another intriguing example is that of the Nissan Leaf. The Leaf – an all-electric five passenger 
compact car – was launched in December 2010. By the end of June 2013 the firm had cumulative 
sales of roughly 70,000 units (Nissan 2013 Annual report), and installed capacity of 250,000 
units/year
24
. The firm claimed that the Leaf was a profitable product
25
 but with estimates of 
Nissan’s commitment to the car running as high as €4bn, and cumulative sales probably no 
greater than $2.2bn, it seems hard to argue that – at least so far – the Leaf has achieved a positive 
rate of return on its investment.
26
 
 
But the Leaf, too, can be viewed as a strategic option against an uncertain future. Carlos Ghosn, 
Nissan’s CEO, defends the Leaf as a long term investment, and as an “asset to the brand.” 27 He 
hopes to use it enter the Chinese market, and he also believes that the company’s head start in 
electric vehicle battery technology may give it a long term advantage (Burgelman and Schifrin, 
2011). As in the case of Unilever’s tea business, in the “business as usual” scenario it’s hard to 
see the Leaf as a huge success. But Nissan can certainly afford the investment -- in 2012, 
Nissan’s revenues were $94bn, and net income was over $5bn (Nissan AR 2012) – and again, 
should consumer preferences shift towards sustainability, or should the political climate shift to 
support widespread carbon regulation, Nissan’s first mover position may give it a very 
significant advantage in a “demand driven opportunity” world.  
 
A number of other major consumer orientated companies similarly appear to be preparing for a 
world in which consumers increasingly value sustainable products. For example it is probably 
not the case that Chipotle’s recent remarkable growth has been driven by its commitment to 
“Food with Integrity”, since in a 2007 interview the CEO of Chipotle estimated that only about 
5% of his consumers knew about the campaign and the company conducts only minimal 
advertising.
28
 But the firm’s positioning both give it an edge with those consumers who do value 
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sustainable agriculture and means that should consumer tastes shift the company will be well 
positioned to meet them.  
 
The renewable energy strategies currently being pursued by many of the large energy suppliers 
can similarly be best understood as strategic hedges, placed against the possibility that carbon 
will be regulated or taxed in the foreseeable future, and/or that the price of conventional energy 
will rise dramatically. For example the economics of Duke Energy’s plan to build a nuclear 
reactor look only marginally profitable given today’s energy prices and regulatory regime, but 
would look a great deal better should either shift (Vietor and Reinhardt, 2014), while BP’s 
$2.9bn in range of renewable technologies including wind, solar and biofuels,
29
 almost certainly 
has a similar strategic rationale.  
 
 
Implications for leading sustainable change 
 
This framing has a number of important implications for the leadership of sustainable change. In 
the first place it suggests that developing a deep understanding of key uncertainties – and 
incorporating them directly into the firm’s strategic thinking – may be critically important to 
building an accurate and persuasive business case for sustainability. In many contexts it is a 
mistake to blindly insist that acting sustainably is simply “the right thing to do” or that is always 
likely to be profitable. Some of the discussion around shared value, for example, can be 
construed as suggesting that the set of actions that simultaneously make a difference in the world 
and create value for the firm is clearly delineated. In reality, however, this boundary is both 
fuzzy and constantly changing – and this has important implications both for how the strategic 
process should be led and for how organizational efforts designed to improve the sustainability 
of the firm should be managed.  
 
Managing the strategy process 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
29
 http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9030041&contentId=7055175 
Accessed 2/1/2014 
21 
 
In established businesses dominated by incremental change, strategic planning is often difficult 
to distinguish from budgeting, and is largely a matter of planning incremental extensions to the 
current business. Indeed in many firms the immediate needs of the firm’s largest customers 
dominate the strategic agenda, making it very difficult to invest in anything significant different 
(Christensen, 1997). The fact that the business case for sustainability is – for many sectors and 
firms – likely to be dependent on the recognition of the uncertainties facing the world and the 
potential advantage that may be realized by anticipating them suggests that one of the most 
important tasks for leaders trying to driven their organization towards sustainability is the 
development of a strategic process that incorporates the time and expertise necessary to do the 
kind of uncertainty driven strategic framing I have outlined above. Such a process, for example, 
would invest heavily in understanding the nature of the most salient uncertainties facing the 
business, would carefully tracks them over time (Wilkinson and Kupers, 2014), and would focus 
attention on those investments that are likely to be “robust”, in that they are worth making in a 
range of possible futures.  
 
Developing such a process is also likely to have a number of important organizational benefits. 
Strategic discontinuities must be coupled with organizational discontinuities if they are to be 
navigated successfully. Large, successful firms often react to them first with denial – “it’s not 
happening” – then with skepticism “even it does happen we won’t  be able to make any money’ 
and then with incompetence and inertia, as old identities, structures and processes make the 
execution of new strategies difficult (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Hannan and Freeman, 
1989).  
 
Effective strategic framing can be a powerful tool to help overcome these kinds of barriers. In 
the first place, new frames can help to confront denial. The reluctance to admit the possibility 
that the world is fundamentally changing is deeply rooted in both individual cognition and in the 
dynamics of firm identity. In this context, simply asserting that the world is changing and 
expecting the organization to shift is unlikely to be successful. But using a tool like scenario 
analysis – one that moves the debate away from the question of “is global warming real?” to “is 
there a real possibility that an increased public perception that global warming is real may lead to 
increased regulation of global warming gases?” can be enormously helpful in reframing 
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perceptions. Figure 5, for example, shows the probabilities that two groups of executives placed 
on the long term uncertainties of figure 4 in the context of a discussion of the energy supply 
business, on the one hand, and in the context of the consumer goods industry, on the other.
30
  
 
Figure 5 about here 
 
In both cases the “business as usual” scenario – no major shift in the technological opportunity 
set and no major shift in either consumer demands or the regulatory context – is the most likely 
scenario. But in both cases the odds of its coming to pass – if one believes these executives -- is 
less than 50%. My experience has been that if this recognition – that by their own reckoning the 
odds of the “business as usual” scenario continuing into the indefinite future are less than 50/50 -
- changes the conversation amongst a group in significant ways. Indeed in some cases I have 
seen it support a major shift in orientation – away from “it isn’t going to happen” to “it might 
happen” – and – most importantly -- to the idea that assuming that there is no real chance that 
sustainable business models will be important is a mistake. This kind of analysis can be also be 
organizationally helpful is that it immediately highlights the business case for investing in 
“experiments”, and for developing the organizational capabilities that will be required to make 
these experiments a success. 
 
Another benefit of thinking through the potential for sustainable business models from this 
perspective is that it also focuses attention on the factors that are likely to resolve the 
uncertainties that are central to any decision, and most importantly on the degree to which firms 
themselves can affect these uncertainties. For example, Unilever’s decision to put its entire tea 
business on a sustainable footing has been followed by similar announcements from all of its 
major competitors. What might thus have been a competitive disadvantage for the firm has thus 
been transformed into table stakes – and possibly into an advantage, since Unilever has a very 
significant head start in greening its supply chain. While one cannot be sure that Unilever’s 
behavior has caused this shift, it certainly seems within the realm of possibility. Similarly 
Nissan’s investment in electric vehicles has been accompanied by a commitment to sell the 
technology that it develops as a result to the rest of the industry, thus significantly reducing the 
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costs of other firms also introducing electric vehicles – and potentially accelerating the adoption 
of the infrastructure needed to support them. The private sector investments in clean energy that 
have played a huge role in driving down the cost of both wind and solar energy – some observers 
now believe that solar energy may be cost competitive with fossil fuel based energy by 2020 in 
most applications – have similarly changed both the political climate surrounding carbon 
regulation.  
 
More broadly, it seems plausible that many of the shifts in consumer preferences and/or in the 
political environment that are likely to make the widespread deployment of profitable sustainable 
models profitable are unlikely to happen without coordinated action at either the level of the 
industry or the state. Building the basis for a sustained conversation about sustainable business 
models thus has the potential to support the firm’s engagement in these broader networks and 
levels of action. For example Nike has been central to the apparel industry’s effort to improve 
both environmental and labor standards, while HP and IBM appear to have played similarly 
critical roles within the IT industry. There is some evidence that these kinds of efforts can play a 
crucial role in complementing local state based regulation (Locke, 2013). Thinking about 
strategic efforts within this kind of contingent framework may thus be a means for engaging the 
organization in the kinds of long term, multiple player based effort that is almost certainly 
critical to long term sustainable change.  
 
Organizational implications 
 
Thinking of many sustainability orientated investments as hedges against risk or as strategic bets 
against future states of the world also highlights the fact that they may need to be managed quite 
differently from investments designed to pay off in the near future, in ways that are orientated 
towards the support of flexibility and innovation. Shifts in strategy must be coupled with shifts in 
organizational architectures. This is a theme that is taken up extensively in the other chapters of 
this volume, but the scenario based perspective provides a particularly useful lens through which 
one can understand quite how important this is likely to be and why it is likely to be particularly 
difficult because it makes explicit the fact that there is no guarantee that these efforts will be 
successful. 
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As a long literature has suggested, the organizational structures best suited to exploit the existing 
business are quite distinct from those required to explore new possibilities (March, 1991; 
Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1997; Tushman, O’Reilly, Harreld, Ancona, 
Edmondson, this book)). Running the existing business well requires well developed skills in 
operational excellence and the ability to execute rapidly and effectively, while building entirely 
new businesses often requires abandoning existing routines and procedures in favor of new ways 
of operating that support creativity, flexibility and the ability to fail. These two modes typically 
require quite different organizational structures, quite different incentive structures and quite 
different time frames and formal metrics. 
 
If it is indeed the case that in many firms’ environmental investments are strategic bets against 
possible futures, managing them will require holding the tension between these two very distinct 
modes of organizing. Opportunities within the “business as usual” quadrant may challenge the 
organization, but they have the great advantage of being at least no minimally profitable 
according to the firm’s established metrics. Opportunities in the other three quadrants are – by 
definition – only likely to be significant sources of financial return in the potentially quite distant 
future and in some – very uncertain – states of the world. They are exploratory by their very 
nature, and investing effectively in them is likely to require both the implementation of local 
mechanisms that ensure they are managed to allow for creativity and flexibility and the 
development of the capability at the most senior level of the firm to manage two very different 
kinds of project simultaneously. In this context effective leadership must be “ambidextrous” – 
able to support the evolution of the firm’s identity and organization in a way that both honors the 
firm’s pasts and invests against its probable future. This is the task explored in the subsequent 
chapters of this volume.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have argued that making the business case for sustainable environmental change 
is both more complex and more interesting than is generally assumed. I have argued that as many 
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observers have suggested, in some industries and for some firms the benefits of environmental 
action can be directly internalized today, focusing particularly on the benefits of using raw 
materials more efficiently, securing supply, preventing brand damage, selling to the sustainable 
niche and building entirely new businesses. But I have further suggested that for many firms, the 
case for sustainable change is better understood as a strategic bet against a number of possible 
future states. I have suggested that if this is the case it not only explains why cross sectional 
studies of the relationship between environmental action and financial returns have yielded such 
mixed results, but also has important implications for the ways in which one should think about 
leading and learning how to execute sustainable change 
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Figure 1: Long-term financial performance of ~1,100 CEOs against their companies’ social and 
environmental performance for their last two years in office.  
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Reprinted with permission from “The Best-Performing CEOs in the World” by Morten T. Hansen, Herminia Ibarra, and Urs Peyer.
Harvard Business Review, January 2013. Copyright © 2013 by Harvard Business Publishing; all rights reserved.
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Figure 2: The McKinsey Cost Curve 
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 Figure 3: The evolution of commodity prices 1962-2012 
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 Figure 4: One possible scenario grid 
 
 
 
Political pressure 
and/or consumer sentiment
creates strong demand for 
“sustainable” products/services
Minimal demand for
sustainable
products/services
Technological advance is slow:
Acting sustainably expensive
“Demand driven opportunity”
“Business as usual” “Supply driven opportunity”
“Green goes mainstream”
Technological advance is rapid:
Acting sustainably is cost effective
33 
 
 
 
Figure 5A: Estimated uncertainties in the energy supply industry 
 
 
 
Figure 5B: Estimated uncertainties in a consumer goods industry 
 
